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INTRODUCTION
Understanding how our brains represent and misrepresent our 
world and how such representations guide our behavior is a key goal 
for neuroscience and psychiatry (Kandel, 1999). Symptoms such 
as hallucinations and delusions, associated with mental illnesses 
like schizophrenia, involve gross alterations in the experience of 
reality (Crow, 1980). For sufferers of these symptoms, the world 
can seem strange, sinister and sometimes inexplicable (Matussek, 
1954; Conrad, 1958; McGhie and Chapman, 1961; Arieti, 1974). 
The drive to explain away odd experiences can result in delusion 
formation (Maher, 1974; Kapur, 2003), which then sculpts and 
vitiates future experiences and attributions (Jaspers, 1963; Pally, 
2007; Corlett et al., 2009b).
Perception  (Helmholtz, 1878/1971) and memory (Schacter 
et al., 1998) are substantially constructive; what we perceive and 
remember is strongly inﬂ  uenced by our prior experiences and 
expectancies. This interaction between efferent stimulation 
and top-down expectation reﬂ  ects an efﬁ  cient approach to rep-
resenting reality (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005), but it leaves 
us susceptible to mistakes; manifest as perceptual and cognitive 
illusions: percepts and recollections that depart from objective 
reality (Gregory, 1996). Our memories are subject to experi-
ence-dependent biases (Bartlett, 1932) and are highly mutable 
(Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Estes, 1997). For example, with repeated 
retrieval of a memory comes repeated reconsolidation, a process 
of re-  stabilization which is susceptible to physiological noise that 
can sculpt a memory into a misrepresentation of what actually 
occurred (Estes, 1997; Corlett et al., 2009b).
Individuals with schizophrenia may experience illusions dif-
ferently. For example, they are less susceptible to some perceptual 
illusions (Emrich, 1989; Dakin et al., 2005), but they sometimes 
form false memories about what they have perceived (Moritz and 
Woodward, 2002) and they can falsely attribute the source of those 
memories to entities external to themselves (Keefe et al., 1999). These 
observations could result from a poor speciﬁ  cation of prior expect-
ancies, leading perceptual illusions to fail, recollections to become 
confused, and on-going experiences to be unusually salient (Gray 
et al., 1991; Hemsley, 1994). It has been suggested that symptoms of 
psychosis can be explained in terms of these alterations (Gray et al., 
1991; Kapur, 2003; Corlett et al., 2007a, 2009a,b) and this has led to 
a renewed interest in the how patients perform on the sorts of learn-
ing tasks that engage these processes (Corlett et al., 2007b; Jensen 
et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2008; Roiser et al., 2009). In particular, 
recent work has invoked abnormalities in prediction error signal-
ing as a possible underlying factor in the emergence of psychosis 
(Corlett et al., 2006, 2007b; Schlagenhauf et al., 2009). However, while 
recent experimental examinations of the hypothesis have tended to 
involve trial-by-trial reinforcement learning tasks [with some notable 
exceptions (Menon et al., 2005; Holt et al., 2006; Gibbs et al., 2007, 
2008)], it is also possible to explore these  processes in the context of 
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a memory domain also known to be abnormal in schizophrenia, that 
of episodic memory (Tulving, 1987). If prediction errors govern false 
memory, and psychosis results from aberrant prediction error, then 
individuals who are prone psychotic experiences may be differentially 
susceptible to forming illusory false memories.
One well-established way of producing illusory memory was 
described by Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995). 
This “DRM” effect manifests as a greater tendency to assert falsely 
that a prototype word (e.g. sleep) was seen when it is presented 
following a study list consisting of a number of its semantic associ-
ates (night, dream etc). That is, subjects report an illusory or false 
memory for non-presented words that are highly associated with 
the words that they were asked to remember.
The most recent theoretical perspectives on this effect relate 
strongly to the notions of surprise and prediction error that we have 
raised above. The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea and 
Williams, 1998; Whittlesea, 2002) suggests that subjects monitor their 
cognitive processing by comparing expectations about their perform-
ance with their current processing. Both true and false familiarity are 
experienced when a comparison between expectations and outcomes 
within a processing episode elicits a surprise or prediction error. Like 
reward prediction errors and other expectancy violations, this moti-
vates the person to seek an explanation, attributing the surprise to some 
plausible source in the current environment or to similar features in the 
past. Prototype words in the DRM feel surprisingly ﬂ  uent, they exceed 
the ﬂ  uency threshold being used to perform the task. Subjects ascribe 
this ﬂ  uency to a source in the past, experiencing a conscious feeling 
of familiarity for words that were not presented to them (Whittlesea 
et al., 2005). In short, because the prototype word is strongly related to 
the list of words that were actually studied, it is processed with greater 
ﬂ  uency and this ﬂ  uency engenders the surprise signal that is interpreted 
incorrectly to mean that the word was actually presented.
Thus, this illusion offers the opportunity to explore prediction 
error-related function in the context of episodic memory. If surprise 
or prediction error is the basis for the DRM illusion then individuals 
with aberrant prediction error processing might be expected to experi-
ence the illusion in differing ways. To this end, we sought to determine 
whether there were individual differences in the DRM effect that could 
be related to attenuated psychosis-like experiences and beliefs (Eckblad 
and Chapman, 1983; Peters et al., 1999). This approach has proven 
successful in previous investigations of source memory impairments 
and how they relate to psychosis-like experiences (Simons et al., 2006, 
2008). We assessed the DRM effect in healthy volunteers and asked 
them to complete questionnaires that assayed their susceptibility to 
unusual experiences and beliefs. Based on our previous ﬁ  nding that 
individuals most sensitive to prediction error were more likely to expe-
rience perceptual aberrations and delusional ideation following treat-
ment with the psychotomimetic drug ketamine (Corlett et al., 2006), 
we predicted that those individuals who were most sensitive to the 
DRM illusion would have the most severe psychosis-like experiences 
including strange perceptual experiences and odd beliefs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
All participants tested were undergraduate students at the University 
of Cambridge, recruited through poster and email advertisement. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 22 years (mean 21.16, SD 
1.13 years). They participated in the study for the chance to win 
a prize for most accurate performance on the computer task. 50 
participants were tested in total (18 males and 32 females). All sub-
jects provided informed consent, and had a clear understanding of 
what the task involved before beginning. The study was approved 
by the Cambridge Psychological Research Ethics Committee, 
Cambridge, England.
COGNITIVE TASK
The DRM task replicated Whittlesea et al. (2005). Word stimuli 
were taken from Stadler et al. (1999). There were 36 semantic 
prototypes, each with a list of 15 high-frequency word associates 
(Stadler et al., 1999). For example, for the prototype word cold, 
associates (in descending order of associative frequency) would 
be hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather, 
freeze, air, shiver, arctic and frost. The words in each list tend to 
be elicited as associates of the prototype in free recall, the higher 
up the list the stronger the association with the prototype word 
(Stadler et al., 1999).
Two shortened lists of six words were created from each 15 word 
list. The ﬁ  rst shortened list consisted of the odd-numbered items 
from each list, beginning with the third word (for the example above: 
warm, ice, frigid, heat, freeze, shiver), and the other shortened list 
consisted of the even-numbered items from the list, beginning with 
the fourth word (in this case winter, wet, chilly, weather, air, arctic). 
The 15th word, the prototype and the two highest associates from 
the list were not included in the shortened lists. This resulted in 
72 lists of six words, each associated with a prototype and the two 
highest associates. Eighteen of these six-word lists were assigned to 
each of the four test conditions for each participant. This was done 
at random for each condition and for each participant.
The task was presented in the DMDX stimulus delivery pro-
gramme, on an Advantech PPC-123T portable PC running 
Windows 98, with a 12.1” screen.
In each trial, participants were shown one list of six words. 
Each word was presented in white letters at the centre of a black 
screen for 120 ms, followed immediately by the next word in the 
list. Following the presentation of these six words, a question was 
displayed for 3 s asking whether a particular word had been seen 
in the list, for example ‘Did you see the word tiger?’ At the start 
of the task, two practice trials were presented, comprising words 
that were not present in the task lists. We adopted this method 
of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) because of our interest 
in the relationships between expectancy, experience and memory 
(Luo et al., 1998; McDermott and Watson, 2001; Whittlesea et al., 
2005). Indeed, forming false memories about rapidly presented 
visual information and having an hallucination may have a great 
deal in common (Reed et al., 2008). In this respect, a secondary 
aim of our study is to relate the salience hypotheses of psychosis 
more directly to hallucination-like experiences.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately 
as possible by pressing the computer key corresponding to their 
decision. The keys were the left and right shift key on a standard 
keyboard, the relevant key was labeled with a sticker saying ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to avoid confusion. The role of the particular keys was counter-
balanced across subjects. After Moritz and Woodward (2002), we 
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decisions by holding the button down for longer if they were more 
conﬁ  dent. If they were guessing they tapped the key, if they were 
very conﬁ  dent they pressed and held for longer.
There were four different list and target word conditions, each 
consisting of 18 trials, presented in a different order for each 
subject:
(1)  Congruent prototype lure – a prototype was presented imme-
diately after one of the lists of its six high-frequency associa-
tes. The prototype did not appear in the list of associates.
(2)  Incongruent prototype lure – a prototype was presented imme-
diately after one of the lists of six high-frequency associates 
for a different prototype. The prototype did not appear in the 
list of associates.
(3)  Highest associate presented – a highest associate was presen-
ted immediately after one of the lists of six high-frequency 
associates for its prototype. In this case, the highest associate 
presented in the question was inserted into the list at random 
in locations 2–5, so that it was always preceded by at least one 
word and was never the ﬁ  nal word.
(4)  Highest associate not presented – a highest associate was pre-
sented immediately after one of the lists of six high-frequency 
associates for a different prototype.
QUESTIONNAIRES
Subjects completed the following questionnaires:
–  Chapman Scales (Eckblad and Chapman, 1983), which pro-
vided a measure of schizotypy, separated into subscales of 
magical ideation, physical anhedonia, social anhedonia, and 
perceptual aberration.
–  Peters Delusion Inventory (Peters et al., 1999), which provi-
ded measures of unusual beliefs including endorsement and 
preoccupation.
–  Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ( Strahan and 
Gerbasi, 1973) which provided a measure of the tendency of 
the participant to give answers that are perceived as accepta-
ble by the investigator, rather than giving an account of their 
true experience. It poses questions about behaviours that are 
socially desirable but relatively uncommon, or that are socially 
undesirable but relatively common within the population.
Subjects also completed other questionnaires, the data from 
which will be reported elsewhere.
PLANNED ANALYSES
DRM task results
The DRM effect was summarized as the difference in probability 
of a false alarm to a related prototype and the probability of a 
false alarm to an unrelated prototype. Given the aim of the study; 
to explore the relationship between attenuated psychotic experi-
ences and susceptibility to the DRM illusion, we also computed a 
more continuous measure of the illusion, incorporating subject’s 
conﬁ  dence in their memories. First, we corrected for inter-subject 
variability in conﬁ  dence by subtracting each subject’s mean conﬁ  -
dence across all conditions from their response on every trial and 
then squaring this value, to express subjects’ conﬁ  dence for every 
trial as a positive value. We then calculated a mean conﬁ  dence in 
the errors that subjects made on DRM trials (when they were asked 
if they had been presented with a related prototype lure). This gave 
us a value for subject’s conﬁ  dence in having perceived prototype 
words that they were not actually presented.
Relating task and questionnaire data
Subjects’ total scores on the Chapman Schizotypy scales provided a 
summary of their total schizotypy, incorporating both attenuated 
positive and attenuated negative symptoms. Subject’s tendency to 
endorse odd beliefs as well as their preoccupation with and convic-
tion were rated using the Peters’ Delusion Inventory (PDI). Total 
scores on both scales were separately regressed onto both the prob-
ability and conﬁ  dence assays of the DRM.
Given our a priori hypotheses about salience, expectancy and 
belief subsequent planned analyses ignored physical and social 
anhedonia (since they relate to attenuated negative symptoms) and 
examined the relationships between conﬁ  dence in the DRM illusion 
and subjects’ summed scores on the magical ideation and perceptual 
aberration subscales. Items on the Magical Ideation scale captured the 
sorts of aberrant experience that are crucial to salience based models 
of psychosis-like experiences (Gray et al., 1991; Hemsley, 1994; Kapur, 
2003; Corlett et al., 2007a, 2009b). For example, the magical ideation 
scale includes items such as “I have noticed sounds on my records 
that are not there at other times”, “I have felt that there were messages 
for me in the way things were arranged, like in a store window”, and 
“I sometimes have a feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain 
people look at me or touch me.” Items on the perceptual aberration 
subscale are more concerned with the intensity of percepts, unusual 
bodily experiences and aberrations of agency.
Signal detection theory and psychosis-like experiences
Subjects’ decision making on this task may have been inﬂ  uenced by 
a number of different factors including their perceptual sensitivity 
(their ability to perceive very rapidly presented stimuli) and their 
response biases (e.g. how frequently they believed we would actually 
present them with words that we subsequently questioned them 
on). We captured subjects’ sensitivity and response biases with a 
signal detection theory (SDT) analysis (Green and Swets, 1966). 
In brief, SDT conceives of decision making under uncertainty as 
a process of discerning between two distributions; that of internal 
physiological noise and the impact of real signals (plus noise) on 
the nervous system (see Figure 3A).
Perceptual sensitivity is summarized using d′ (d-prime), the 
difference in the peaks of the internal noise and signal plus noise 
distributions. We estimated d-prime for each subject from our data 
as the difference between the normalized hit rate (correctly endors-
ing a word that was presented) and the normalized false alarm rate 
(incorrectly endorsing a prototype word that was not presented. 
The more sensitive the participant is at discriminating between 
presented target and prototype lures, the larger the d′ value will be 
(MacMillan and Creelman, 1991; Shapiro, 1994; Fox, 2004).
We calculated subjects’ response bias or criterion, c, by multiply-
ing the sum of the standardized scores of the hit rates and the false 
alarm rates by −0.5 (MacMillan and Creelman 1991; Shapiro, 1994; 
Fox, 2004). When the false alarm rate for prototype lures equals 
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no difference between the number of false memories formed by 
patients with schizophrenia and matched control subjects (Moritz 
and Woodward, 2002). Patients with schizophrenia were, however, 
more conﬁ  dent in the DRM memory errors they made (Moritz 
and Woodward, 2002). Similarly, we observed a signiﬁ  cant correla-
tion between subjects’ conﬁ  dence in their false memories and their 
total score on the Chapman scales (r = 0.271, p = 0.04, r2 = 0.07). 
[There was also a strong trend toward this measure predicting the 
number of unusual beliefs endorsed on the Peter’s delusion inven-
tory (r = 0.272, p = 0.06, r2 = 0.07].
When we examined the subscales most relevant to the cognitive 
models under investigation, we found a signiﬁ  cant correlation between 
positive schizotypy and conﬁ  dence in the DRM illusion (r = 0.374, 
p = 0.008, r2 = 0.11). Subjects who were most conﬁ  dent in their false 
memories were most likely to have experienced perceptual aberrations 
or to have endorsed magical ideas (see Figure 1). In post hoc conﬁ  rma-
tory analyses, neither social nor physical anhedonia were signiﬁ  cantly 
associated with conﬁ  dence in DRM errors (r < 0.1, p > 0.5).
Partial correlation analyses took into account potentially con-
founding factors; the correlation remained signiﬁ  cant when age 
(r = 0.374, p = 0.008) and social desirability (as measured with 
the Marlow-Crowne scale, r = 0.383,  p = 0.007,  r2 = 0.15)  were 
taken into account. There were too few left-handed participants 
to examine the effects of handedness on our variables of interest, 
however, removal of left-handed participants did not eliminate the 
signiﬁ  cant relationship between magical ideation scores and DRM 
susceptibility (n = 45, r = 0.397, p = 0.007, r2 = 0.16).
We also explored the relationship between failure to recall events 
that were actually presented and schizotypal experiences. There were 
no signiﬁ  cant associations between odd experiences and beliefs and 
likely to say “yes” as to say “no” in making recognition judgments 
(MacMillan, 1991; Shapiro, 1994; Fox, 2004). When this happens, 
the value for c is zero and the criterion is considered unbiased 
(MacMillan, 1991; Fox, 2004). When the false alarm rate is greater 
than the miss rate, the bias is toward answering “yes,” indicating a 
liberal criterion bias with a negative value (MacMillan, 1991; Fox, 
2004). On the other hand, when the miss rate is greater than the 
false alarm rate, the bias is toward answering “no”, indicating a 
conservative criterion bias with a positive value (MacMillan, 1991; 
Fox, 2004). See Figure 3B Bias and Criterion scores were regressed 
onto our measures of positive schizotypy to assess the relationships 
between illusory memories and aberrant beliefs and experiences.
RESULTS
DRM TASK RESULTS
Our subjects’ demonstrated a DRM memory illusion; the rate of 
false alarms to prototype words that were semantically related to 
the preceding word list was signiﬁ  cantly higher than the false alarm 
rate for prototype words that were unrelated to the preceding list 
[t(49) = 10.828, p < 0.001]. Recognition performance was good, 
subjects correctly reported having seen a word with which they 
were presented signiﬁ  cantly better than chance [t(49) = 10.678, 
p < 0.001]. However, their performance was not perfect, on aver-
age, subjects incorrectly guessed that a presented word was in fact 
novel on 5 out of 18 trials.
RELATING TASK AND QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
We found no association between probability of making DRM 
errors and schizotypy scores or delusion-like ideation. However, this 
is perhaps unsurprising, given that Morris and Woodward found 
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FIGURE 1 | The relationship between DRM conﬁ  dence and odd beliefs/experiences: Scatter-plot of subject’s conﬁ  dence in DRM errors and their self-rated 
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the number of failures to endorse experienced events, nor subjects 
conﬁ  dence in these errors and the severity of their unusual experi-
ences and ideas. The association between conﬁ  dence in memory 
errors and positive schizotypal traits appeared to be speciﬁ  c to 
DRM false memories rather than related to poor task performance 
or inappropriate conﬁ  dence in false memories in general.
SDT AND PSYCHOSIS-LIKE EXPERIENCE
There was no signiﬁ  cant correlation between d′ and psychosis-like 
experiences or beliefs. However, there was a signiﬁ  cant negative cor-
relation between criterion and positive schizotypy score (r = −0.353, 
p = 0.019, r2 = 0.12) that is, subjects with a more liberal acceptance 
bias (calculated from their decisions on the DRM trials) were also 
more likely to endorse having had unusual perceptual experiences 
and to hold unusual beliefs (see Figures 2 and 3).
Finally, as a test of internal consistency, we examined the correla-
tion between criterion and conﬁ  dence in DRM false memories, the 
signiﬁ  cant relationship (r = –0.362, p = 0.016, r2 = 0.13) uniﬁ  es two 
of our measures of sensitivity to the illusion that relate to psychosis-
like experiences and beliefs; subjects with a liberal acceptance bias 
on the task were more conﬁ  dent in the DRM errors that they made 
and more likely to have had odd perceptions and beliefs.
DISCUSSION
We produced illusory memories in healthy individuals using a well-
established approach. As expected, participants were more likely 
to assert falsely that they recalled a word when it was semanti-
cally related to words with which they actually had been presented. 
Critically individuals who were prone to unusual experiences and 
beliefs were more conﬁ  dent in these illusory memories.
So, why might it be the case that these conﬁ  dent but false  assertions 
tend to covary with the tendency to endorse beliefs about such things 
as supernatural occurrences or extraterrestrial creatures? The false 
sense of ﬂ  uency or familiarity of prototype words in this task has 
been suggested to engage a surprise or prediction error: prototypes 
feel more familiar than subjects expect them to, leading them to con-
clude that the words had been previously presented (Whittlesea et al., 
2005). The statistically signiﬁ  cant association between susceptibility 
to this effect and the severity of schizotypal beliefs and experiences 
suggest that prediction error-driven false ﬂ  uency may provide the 
basis both for susceptibility to the illusion and to the unusual experi-
ences and ideas that characterize schizotypy. That is, task-engendered 
false familiarity might have a common cognitive and neural basis 
with false familiarity experiences in daily life, experiences which 
manifest as perceptual aberrations and odd beliefs.
In previous work we found that larger prediction error responses 
(engendered by violating learned expectancies) predisposed healthy 
subjects to perceptual aberrations and delusional ideation when they 
were administered the psychotomimetic drug ketamine (Corlett 
et al., 2006). Speciﬁ  cally, a region of right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (rDLPFC) appears to be sensitive to prediction error  during 
learning (Fletcher et al., 2001; Corlett et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2004)., 
and, the greater the magnitude of that response, the more likely sub-
jects were to experience aberrant salience and referential ideas on 
ketamine (Corlett et al., 2006). While we did not have personality 
measures on these individuals it is noteworthy that false memories 
on the DRM task are also associated with augmented rDLPFC acti-
vation (Kim and Cabeza, 2007) and lesions of the DLPFC impair 
familiarity based memory processing (Kishiyama et al., 2009). Taken 
together, these data imply that DLPFC over   activity might engage 
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FIGURE 2 | The correlation between criterion and positive schizotypy: Scatter-plot of subject’s criterion values and their susceptibility to odd beliefs. A low 
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The present ﬁ  nding is redolent of investigations of healthy 
  individuals prone to hallucinations who show a similar bias 
toward reporting stimuli that did not occur (Bentall and Slade, 
1985; Tsakanikos and Reed, 2005a,b; Reed et al., 2008). We show 
that a conﬁ  rmatory or expectancy bias, possibly engendered by 
sensitivity to prediction errors (Whittlesea et al., 2005), relates not 
the prediction error-driven false familiarity that leads to DRM false 
memories as well as odd experiences and ideas. Further support for 
this comes from a subsequent observation that DLPFC prediction 
error activations are perturbed in individuals with early psychosis 
and the extent of that disruption is predictive of delusion severity 
across subjects (Corlett et al., 2007b).
FIGURE 3 | Signal Detection Theory, Memory and Psychosis. (A) The role of 
familiarity or ﬂ  uency in decision making about memory. Subjects make inferences 
about whether or not they have experienced an event by comparing the ﬂ  uency/
familiarity they experience with these distributions. In green, the familiarity of 
events that truly occurred, in red, that of events that did not take place. The area 
under the curves in blue, represents the region of highest ambiguity. (B) The 
criterion subjects use to make inferences reﬂ  ects their decision bias, subjects 
with a low criterion endorse more experiences that did not actually take place. The 
correlation we observed between low criterion and positive schizotypy suggests 
that the perceptual aberrations and odd beliefs that subjects reported were related 
to this criterion value. Subjects with a low criterion on the DRM task would be 
more likely to report conﬁ  dent illusory false memories, we would also expect 
them to imbue ambiguous or uncertain percepts (like the image of rocks from the 
surface of Mars) with meaning, concluding that they represented a face.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 53  |  7
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Recent computational models in psychology and neuroscience 
recognize the overlap between Bayes theorem, SDT and associa-
tive learning (Courville et al., 2006; Dayan and Daw, 2008), in 
all types of theory, what is learned, remembered and perceived 
is governed not only by current inputs but also past experiences 
and expectancies (Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984). Our data sup-
port the notion that predictions and prediction errors interact 
in a Bayesian manner in the service of cognition and percep-
tion (Hemsley and Garety, 1986; Corlett et al., 2009a; Fletcher 
and Frith, 2009). Strong priors and strong prediction errors lead 
to false ﬂ  uency of processing and an inappropriate feeling of 
familiarity that engenders perceptual aberrations and magical 
ideation. According to Estes, strong prior expectancy biases in 
memory can arise through repeated cycles of recollection and 
reconsolidation in which physiological noise vitiates the recon-
solidated memory and biases it away from what actually occurred. 
We recently hypothesised that this mechanism may be responsible 
for the maintenance of delusional ideas and aberrant perceptions 
(Corlett et al., 2009b) we believe the observed association between 
DRM conﬁ  dence, criterion bias and positive schizotypy provide 
initial support for that hypothesis.
Of course, our observation of the relationship between this 
putatively prediction error-driven illusion and everyday experi-
ences and beliefs relates to healthy individuals. The relationship in 
individuals who suffer a mental illness has yet to be elucidated and 
so we must be cautious in our inferences. Nevertheless, the know 
relationships between schizotypy and psychotic illness should be 
emphasized and, moreover, studies such as this offer the invalu-
able opportunity to study experiences and beliefs that are not 
contaminated by the effects of medication. To our knowledge, 
the DRM task has not been studied under conditions of control-
led pharmacological manipulation. However, there is evidence 
that behavioural and brain responses during memory and deci-
sion making tasks are modulated by dopamine (Pessiglione et al., 
2006; Schott et al., 2006; Gibbs et al., 2007, 2008). Furthermore, 
the nature of the dopaminergic effect on decision making (whether 
dopamine agonism improves or impairs perceptual sensitivity) is 
dependent on personality traits such belief in paranormal ideas 
(Krummenacher et al., 2009). We predict that pharmacological 
studies of the DRM effect will show that performance is modulated 
by genetic   variability at dopaminergic loci and by administration 
of dopaminergic drugs These pharmacological and genetic effects 
may interact with trait level vulnerability to psychosis-like ideas 
and experiences.
In summary, we have demonstrated an association between 
illusory memories, perceptual aberrations and odd beliefs. This 
ﬁ  nding lends support to the theory that inappropriate salience 
experiences engage an attribution process that leads to  formation 
of aberrant but explanatory beliefs (Kapur, 2003). It is possible 
that inappropriate engagement of the right prefrontal cortex 
mediates false memory formation, odd perceptions and unusual 
beliefs by signaling inappropriate mismatches between expect-
ancy and experience which engage new learning (Corlett et al., 
2007a). While the formation of novel associations may have adap-
tive advantages (Stevens and Price, 2000; Avila et al., 2001), in 
its extreme form, hyperactivity of association ultimately leads to 
psychotic symptoms.
only to  perceptual aberrations but also delusion-like ideas. In what 
may be the earliest translational neuroscience theory of dopamine 
and positive psychotic symptoms, Robert Miller hypothesised that 
dopamine in the basal ganglia set a signiﬁ  cance threshold on cog-
nitive inferences, akin to a signiﬁ  cance level in a statistical test; if 
dopamine were elevated in the brains of psychotic individuals, this 
threshold would decrease with two consequences; an increase in 
the total number of conclusions accepted, and an increase in the 
proportion of these which are, by chance, incorrect (Miller, 1976). 
We speculate that individual differences in dopamine release or 
regulation may underpin the relationships between susceptibil-
ity to the DRM illusion and attenuated psychosis-like symptoms 
that we report, that is, those subjects who reported more conﬁ  dent 
false memories, aberrant experiences and beliefs had sensitized 
dopamine systems which altered their threshold for concluding 
that a particular event occurred (see Figure 3).
The basal ganglia, in particular the striatum, are implicated 
in salience processing (Zink et al., 2003), prediction error-driven 
learning (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003) and aber-
rant salience theories of psychosis (Gray et al., 1991; Kapur, 2003). 
In previous work we found aberrant prediction error responses 
in the striatum, however, the signals in this region were not pre-
dictive of perceptual aberrations or delusional ideation (Corlett 
et al., 2006, 2007b). It is possible that DLPFC (the region whose 
 inappropriate  engagement we found to predict delusions)  represents 
the   conﬂ  uence of inputs from a variety of regions, any noise from 
input regions like VTA and striatum drives maladaptive updating 
of expectations associated with delusions (Corlett et al., 2007b). 
However some patients with schizophrenia have DLPFC hypoac-
tivity and increased striatal engagement (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 
2002). These conﬂ  icting studies may be examining different phases 
of psychosis or engaging different cognitive processes with different 
neural bases. Notably, neither the study of frontostriatal interactions 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2002) nor fMRI studies demonstrating 
aberrant striatal engagement during reward anticipation (Juckel et 
al., 2006) have demonstrated a relationship between inappropriate 
striatal signaling and delusions. Another study that explored the 
relationship between aberrant prediction error and delusions related 
delusion severity to the inappropriate engagement of frontal cortex 
(Schlagenhauf et al., 2009). Clearly the cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms of frontostriatal interaction and their disruption in delusion 
formation is an important topic for future investigations.
We believe this false memory illusion and its relationship with 
aberrant beliefs and experiences favor a Bayesian model of process-
ing in which expected and experienced ﬂ  uency are compared 
in order to judge familiarity, the surprising ﬂ  uency with which 
  prototype words are processed predisposes subjects to   conclude 
they are familiar (Benjamin et al., 1998). We argue that this Bayesian 
account extends to psychosis-like experiences. That is, certain expe-
riences are inappropriately surprising and demand an explanation, 
with repeated surprising experiences, that explanation develops 
into an odd or inappropriate belief (Hemsley and Garety, 1986; 
Fleminger, 1992; Corlett et al., 2009a; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that subjects who were biased to 
endorse having experienced a word in the preceding RSVP list 
( criterion  < 0) were more likely to have higher magical ideation 
and perceptual aberration.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 53  |  8
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